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Finance is a rich field, combining contributions by economists, economic historians, and 
political scientists. My goal is not to provide an extensive review, but to stress several 
perspectives from which the question “How and why do financial systems differ?” has 
been answered. I successively look at (1) developmentalism, (2) capital scarcity, (3) state 
capacity, (4) fixed costs, (5) information costs, (6) social capital, (7) institutional 
commitment, (8) legal origins, (9) market segmentation, (10) curb market, and (11) global 
convergence.
The first approach is extinct. Approaches 2-5 identify a market rigidity or failure—the 
failure of the price system to regulate the flow of funds between investors and borrowers. 
That failure elicits an institutional response—a particular firm-bank-state relation—, 
variations in the type of which reflect variations in the type and intensity of the market 
failure. In contrast, approaches 5-10 identify a regulatory failure in the form of deficient 
property rights (social capital, institutional commitment, and legal origins), externalities 
(market segmentation), or excessive regulation (curb market).
Developmentalism
The simpler and most empirically-researched hypothesis is that the level of economic 
development is a strong predictor of the degree of development of the financial system. 




























































































1969, 1971), who built a large comparative and historical dataset, and Rondo Cameron 
(1967, 1972), who both performed and stimulated a large number of country studies. 
Goldsmith and Cameron applied to financial systems the central proposition of 
modernization theory—capital accumulation brings about structural differentiation and 
functional specialization in capital markets.1 For instance, Goldsmith wrote that
The development o f financial institutions has followed a very similar path 
in all now developed non-socialist countries. Initially, money issuing and 
deposit banks dominated the picture. Thrift institutions, long-term credit 
banks and insurance organization developed later, but steadily gained in 
importance in relation to the banking system (1975, p. 87).
Although the developmentalist approach did not survive the demise of functionalist 
and macroeconomic logic in the 1970s, the idea that increasing wealth produces financial 
systems that are more functionally differentiated and market-oriented has assumed the 
status of a stylized fact. Wealthier individuals have greater and more differentiated needs 
for financial products. The relative development of corporate security markets is a direct 
reflection of the level of economic development.2 A larger pool of savings implies a higher 
demand for bonds, stocks, and commercial paper.
MARKET FAILURE
Capital Scarcity
In an article published in 1952, Gerschenkron authored the most ambitious 
explanation so far offered for why financial structures differed across nations. The more
1 See his 1965 essay, reproduced as lead article in Cameron 1992.




























































































capital was needed in the shortest amount of time, he argued, the less could equity 
markets cope with the task of allocating long-term financial capital; instead, banks and 
state had to step in. Hence the “orderly system of graduated deviations from [the first] 
industrialization.” 3 British industrialization was self- and market-financed, manufacturers 
ploughing back profits into their own factories; French industrialization (the 1850-1870 
spurt) was financed by investment bankers, who raised long-term capital and lent it to 
factories; German industrialization was financed by universal bankers, intermediating 
between depositors and factories; while Russian industrialization was financed by the 
state, intermediating between taxpayers and foreign lenders on the one hand, and banks 
and factories on the other. Responsible for the need for banks or the state in a situation of 
backwardness were economies of scale, which were characteristic of late industrialization, 
and wanting standards of honesty or mechanisms for the enforcement of contracts.
Gerschenkron’s argument is a two-step argument: the first step links backwardness to 
the timing and rate of industrialization—whether it is continuous or shows a spurt. The 
second step links the timing and rate of industrialization to the organization of the financial 
system—the relative degrees of market, bank, and state intermediation in the provision of 
long-term capital. The first step has been heavily criticized on the ground that not all 
backward economies did industrialize, or did so with a “big spurt.”4 The second step, the 
contribution of markets, banks, and the state to industrialization, has better withheld the 
mark of time. Surely, the fit between timing of industrialization and type of credit system




























































































is far from being perfect: there are cases (Italy and Austria) that exhibited the banking 
traits of late industrialization, despite the fact that their big spurt, by Gerschenkron’s own 
admission, petered out. There is Denmark, an economy that grew faster than Germany in 
the prewar decades, developed universal banking but no large-scale, capital-intensive 
industrialization.4 5
Gerscbenkron left the causes of capital scarcity under-explored. Although, it could be 
a shortage of capital in the national economy as a whole, it most often was a shortage of 
capital flowing to industry. Prussia is a case in point. No overall capital shortage existed 
there during the first half of the 19th century—in fact, Prussia exported capital. But this 
capital was not readily available for industry, as investors preferred government bonds.6
State Capacity
The state capacity literature applied Gerschenkron’s insights to the study of industrial 
policy in the postwar period.7 Zysman (1983) proposed a threefold typology of banking
4 Gerschenkron (1962, p. 234) himself grappled with the Bulgarian case, coming for the occasion the notion o f  “missed
opportunity.” For a thorough review o f  new developments in growth time-series since Gerschenkron, see Sylla and 
Toniolo 1991.
5 Bairoch's (1993, p. 8) data for 1890-1913 show a 2.3 percent annual growth in GNP per capita for Denmark against 1.7
percent for Germany. On Denmark, see Gerschenkron 1962, pp. 16, 361.
6 See Barrett Whale 1968, p. 11; Tilly 1967, p. 156; Schmoller 1904, VoL II, p. 182; Hansen 1906, VoL I, pp. 580-6; 
Beckerath 1954, pp. 7-14; Borchardt 1961. Despite its limitadons, Gerschenkron’s proposition that industrial capital 
shortage made continental banking less specialized than British banking is widely shared among economic historians. In 
a recent review o f Gerschenkron’s contribution, Sylla and Toniolo (1991, p. 24) wrote that “the loose’ version o f  
Gerschenkron’s paradigm still offers a good first insight into [the problem o f  European industrialization] and provides 
a powerful guide in framing the meaningful questions that scholars should ask.” Still, very few historians have endorsed 
Gerschenkron’s synthesis. An exception is Cohen (1967).
7 A second way, not developed here, in which political scientists have used Gerschenkron’s theory is to explain cross­





























































































systems, distinguishing between the French-like “state-led” model, the Anglo-Saxon 
“market-based” model, and the German-like “private-bank organized” model.8 This 
typology is very similar to Gerschenkron’s triptych, with the difference that France, rather 
than Russia, is offered as the paradigm for state banking. The rationale for the choice of 
France reveals a key modification that political scientists brought to Gerschenkron’s 
synthesis when they imported it. Surely there was a strong demand in postwar France for a 
quick rebuilding of the economy. But such was also the case almost everywhere in 
Europe. What made France paradigmatic in its credit policy was the specific institutional 
make-up of the French state—a “strong” state, in Zysman’s terminology. For 
Gerschenkron, the state is a possible substitute for market failure that is a priori identically 
available across nations. For Zysman, and for Shonfield (1965) before him, states differ in 
their capacity to intervene in the economy in general, and in capital markets in particular, 
and this difference, very much like the capital endowment of the economy in 
Gerschenkron’s theory, is an historical legacy.
The notion that state allocation of credit is superior to market allocation in situations 
of industrial catch-up has been qualified. Loriaux (1991) in a study of postwar France 
argued that state banking was not just an efficient way of channeling capital to fast- 
growing sectors or to overcome market failures, but also a means of buying the political 
support of the sectors that were condemned by rapid industrialization. In a similar vein, 
Perez (1997) attributed banking outcomes in Spain and France to the presence of a strong 
leftist challenge, forcing governments to choose a “soft model of interventionism” and





























































































credit expansion.9 Selective credit regulation was abandoned in the 1980s in both counties 
because the governments were too weak governments to designate the victims of credit 
austerity, but found it politically convenient to delegate these difficult decisions to the 
market. In sum, for Loriaux and Perez, political rather than economic considerations were 
the ultimate gauge of efficiency in French and Spanish credit policies.
The Gerschenkron-Zysman synthesis generally found greater support in studies of 
East Asian finance than of Western Europe.10 Yet, even there, Haggard and Maxfield 
expressed caution, arguing that politically-insulated states are, almost by definition, better 
able to control rent seeking, but “unless insulation is accompanied by delegation to 
bureaucratic agencies, then “strong” states can exploit their power for the purpose of 
predation and patrimonialism” (1993, p. 20). The works of Rosenbluth (1989) and Calder 
(1993) on the Japanese financial system similarly debunked the myth of the “strong” 
Japanese state. Whether state banking is a superior or inferior mode of allocation, political 
scientists—including this one—concur that state structures matter as an explanatory 
variable. The question is: Which state structure? Political scientists have so far put much 
weight on the elusive notion of state autonomy or political insulation, overlooking more 
intuitive and measurable notions such as state centralization.
» Perez 1997, p. 76.





























































































Besides capital scarcity, economists have identified an additional source of market 
failure in the development of capital markets—fixed costs.11 Efficient stock markets, in 
addition to a building and special phone lines, require well-informed investors, reliable 
intermediaries, and reputable debtors. More importantly, they need to be liquid—demand 
must elicit supply, and supply must meet demand at all times and at low costs. There is “a 
chicken and egg problem with liquidity,” Rajan and Zingales aptly write, “people will not 
trade in a particular market unless they think the market is liquid, but the market will not 
be liquid unless they trade” (1999, p. 17). Private entrepreneurs and investors could not 
overcome this free riding problem, but used the services of investment bankers and 
institutional investors that had built their reputation dealing with public debt or 
government-financed railway bonds. The public debt was also instrumental in the latter 
acceptance of the private debt. Though partly correct, the fixed-costs thesis cannot be 
pushed too far. In places like Italy and Spain, the existence of a large public debt did not 
vitalize the corporate security market as much as crowd it out.12
Information Asymmetry
The information asymmetry literature illuminates the choice between direct and 
intermediate finance along with providing a rationale for the existence of banks. It justifies 
the existence of relationship banking for firms that are small or young; and it can be used 
to rationalize state-promotion of non-profit banks. Yet, information asymmetry only takes
11 This section draws from Rajan and Zingales 1999.




























































































us so far. It justifies the existence of diverse financial institutions, but is silent on the 
relative occurrence of each.
Entrepreneurs are better informed than investors about the quality of the projects they 
want to develop. This is a classic adverse selection problem, which causes the price of 
projects to be evenly low irrespective of quality.13 As a result, only the bad projects get 
external finance; entrepreneurs with good projects are better off financing those 
themselves. This inefficient outcome sets up the stage for a new role, that of monitor. An 
individual who would monitor a borrower—by screening projects, or preventing 
opportunistic behavior, or performing ex-post audits—could mitigate the adverse selection 
problem. This monitor could either be an analyst, certifying to investors that a borrower is 
sound, or he could be a sophisticated investor, whose stake in the borrower’s project 
would signal that the project is sound, or a deposit bank, lending to the borrower its 
clients’ deposits. How to make sure that the monitor is doing the job properly? Reputation 
suffices to discipline the analyst; the personal stake signals the sophisticated investor’s 
credibility; while diversification into a large number of independent projects guarantees the 
solvency of the deposit bank. If there are scale economies in monitoring projects, as 
Diamond (1984) claims, then the deposit bank is the most efficient monitor. Therefore, 
banks exist, according to Diamond, in order to serve as “delegated monitors".
Since markets and banks co-exist, it is worth asking in what circumstances 
entrepreneurs will prefer direct finance to intermediate debt (commercial paper, bonds, 
and equity are direct finance, loans are intermediate debt). Two complementary solutions




























































































are present in the microeconomics literature.14 Both assume that direct debt is less 
expensive than intermediate debt—a fact that is verified in practice. The first model, by 
Diamond (1991), rests on a firm’s track record. New borrowers borrow from banks 
initially. If, in the process, they acquire a good credit record, their reputation eliminates 
the need for monitoring; they may issue debt directly, without using an intermediary. 
Lower-rated borrowers, in contrast, will still be suspected of moral hazard and remain 
dependent on bank loans and monitoring. The very-low rated ones will be screened out. In 
the second model, by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), the firms overcome the moral hazard 
problem through partial self-financing. By investing its own resources in its own project 
(that is, by having a large capital), the firm credibly signals its private information on the 
high quality of the project along with its commitment to make it work. Uninformed 
investors are willing to directly advance the residual funding without monitoring. In 
contrast, if the firm is capital-constrained and unable to self-finance part of the project, it 
must fall back on monitoring and make do with dearer intermediate finance.
Despite their differences and respective limitations, the two models concur with 
casual observation of reality. Information asymmetry creates a pecking order among firms 
that compete for external funding. Firms that get access to money markets tend to be firms 
that are old and have a good track record, as Diamond’s analysis suggests. This fits quite 
nicely with the common idea that a firm’s funding requirements go through a lifecycle: 
Startups have to rely essentially on internal funds, then on bank assistance as they grow 
larger, and finally on commercial paper and equity once they are sufficiently established to




























































































enable individual to evaluate their earnings with a modicum of confidence.15 Furthermore, 
firms that get access to markets tend to be large and well-capitalized, as Holmstrom and 
Tirole argue. Firms that are small and collateral-poor, in contrast, typically fall back on 
bank loans. In a period of credit crunch, when banks find themselves to be overextended 
and start curbing lending, the small, poorly capitalized firms are hit the hardest. The large 
firms can either renegotiate their loans or go directly to the markets.16 In sum, both 
reputation and capital are substitutes for monitoring. In fact, reputation and capital tend to 
coincide.17
Small and young firms are particularly at risk in periods of credit crunch, when banks 
rein in loans. Firms can insure against this risk, Petersen and Rajan (1994) argue, by 
entering a long-term, exclusive relationship with a bank. Relationship banking—a durable 
relationship spread across a wide array of products—informs the bank about the credit- 
worthiness of the firm, thus reducing the cost of lending. The firm commits itself to remain 
a client of the bank over the long run, and the bank smoothens the cost of capital to the 
firm over the firm’s lifecycle. The bank subsidizes the firm when young and gets repaid 
later. The bank also bridges the firm over during credit crunches.
However, the borrower cannot credibly commit to relationship banking over the long- 
run. It has an interest at some later stage, once it has established a track record with the 
initial bank, to break the relationship with that bank and borrow from competing lenders,
15 See Lamoreaux 1994,154 and Calomizis 1995,262.




























































































who can thus free ride on the initial bank’s efforts. Unable to recoup its initial investment 
in information gathering, the initial bank abstains from making that investment in the first 
place. The problem of time inconsistency has several institutional solutions. A first one is 
the existence of a local banking monopoly, able to enforce exclusivity over the long run— 
this may account for restrictions on branch banking of the unit-banking type.17 8 A second 
related solution is joint membership in a social network—this may account for the 
existence of credit cooperatives, in which members are liable for any loan on which the 
cooperative defaults and thus have an incentive to monitor their peers.19
A third solution is to allow the bank to take an equity position in the firm, enabling 
the bank to share the surplus to which its lending contributed—this may account for the 
existence of universal banking. That is, universal banking for the small, of course. It is 
difficult to build an information-asymmetry argument that would make universal banking 
pertinent to large firms. Large firms need no bank monitoring, unless they are denied 
access to markets for reasons unrelated to information asymmetry.20
17 With perhaps the exception o f banks, which until recently were able— but are not allowed any more— to operate on 
very low capital bases. The strong regulatory harness under which banks operated, however, may have been responsible 
for this anomaly.
18 See Petersen and Rajan 1995.
19 See Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane 1994. Still another solution, according to Haggard and Lee (1995), is a “strong” 
state. This is how they describe the functioning o f capital markets o f  East Asian NICs. Decisions are made 
hierarchically and firms are monitored and coordinated by bureaucrats. Bureaucratic coordination helps economize on 
communication expense and reduce uncertainty.
20 For an opposite view, see Calomiris 1995. Calomiris argues that project diversification and scale economies in 
monitoring allowed the big German banks to price debt lower than English direct finance, even for the largest firms— a 




























































































The information asymmetry paradigm provides solid microeconomic foundations to 
the study of financial institutions. It provides a unified explanation for the diversity of 
financial intermediaries based on a pecking order between borrowers: Large and 
respectable borrowers directly tap the markets, whereas medium and less-capitalized firms 
borrow from intermediaries. Small and undercapitalized borrowers are willing to sacrifice 
their long-term independence and commit to an exclusive relationship with a bank in 
exchange for steady financial support. The very small put up with the collectivist 
atmosphere of a local cooperative. As one moves down the hierarchy, the more pervasive 
and intrusive monitoring gets.
However, the information asymmetry literature says pretty little on the relative 
importance played by direct and intermediate debt, by center and local banks, by 
specialized and universal banks, or by banks and cooperatives. The size and age of firms is 
not a good determinant of what type of ftinding gets selected, for it is partly determined by 
what kind of ftinding is available. Furthermore, many categories overlap. Deutsche 
Bank—a deposit bank—monitored firms in Germany at the turn of the century in the same 
way as J.P. Morgan—an investment bank—did in the United States.21 Last, and most 
importantly, microeconomic efficiency operates within the limits of structural constraints. 
How else to explain that historical accounts of bank-firm relations under tum-of-the- 
century German and postwar Japanese universal banking systems fit like a glove the
21 Contrast Calomins (1995) account o f monitoring by the Berlin Gro|)banlten with D e Long’s (1991) account of J.P. 
Morgan. The difference corresponds with the distinction between “intermediation” and “certification” made by 




























































































description of relationship banking, even though the firms and banks involved in these 
relationships were large enough to qualify for direct finance?
INSTITUTIONAL, LEGAL, OR REGULATORY FAILURE 
Social Capital
The present and following approaches do not start from a market failure, but from an 
institutional failure. The present one stresses the negative role of state centralization in the 
development of a prerequisite of market development—social capital. The literature on 
social capital emphasizes the role of trust, sociability, norms of reciprocity, networks, and 
civic traditions—various concepts that boil down to the propensity, which Tocqueville 
observed two centuries ago in North America, for individuals to cooperate outside the 
family and without the help of the state to produce socially efficient outcomes. Exemplary 
of this revival is Fukuyama’s work on trust.22 Fukuyama (1995) argues that all low-trust 
societies (a category that includes France, Southern Italy, China) share a common 
industrial structure: Numerous private firms that tend to be small and family-controlled 
coexist with a few large-scale enterprises that need the support of the state to be viable. In 
contrast to this “saddle-shaped” distribution of firms, high-trust societies such as the UK, 
the United States, Japan, and Germany have many large and very large managerial 
concerns, perfectly viable without state support. A deficiency in trust reflects the
22 Fukuyama 1995. See also the seminal contributions o f Coleman 1990 and Putnam 1993. The most comprehensive—  
and seemingly conclusive—empirical test o f the social capital argument was administered by La Porta et aL (1997b). 
Using for its measure the percentage o f people answering yes to a question asking them whether they trust people, 
these authors ran a series o f successful regressions on various measures o f  government, civic, business, social, and 




























































































dominance of a centralized and arbitrary state during an earlier phase of historical 
development.23
Though Fukuyama does not draw any, consequences for financial markets seem 
straightforward. The most popular stocks among investors always are those of large-scale 
private companies. Family firms and state-owned firms are either not listed or, even if they 
are, do not attract investors’ attention as much as large private corporations, for they are 
controlled by a core of interests—family members in the case of the family firm, the state 
in that of the state-owned firm—that do not count share value as their first priority. Trust 
and stock market development should thus be linked.
Levy (1999) applied a telescoped version of the social-capital argument to economic 
policymaking in post-dirigiste France. The success of dirigisme in the postwar decades, 
Levy argues, caused an underdevelopment of social and local associations, which came 
back to haunt policymakers when they sought to disengage the state from the economy in 
the 1980s and have banks and private investors take over the financing of industry. In light 
of the failure of market forms of coordination to relay the state, the latter was forced to 
intervene anew, rescuing ailing firms.
Institutional Commitment
The institutional commitment literature is even more explicit in condemning autocratic 
rule. Markets fail to develop not so much because individuals are coordinating on the 
wrong play, but because absolute monarchs cannot secure their subjects’ property rights. 
Looking at England, North and Weingast (1989) argue that the crown’s ability to build a




























































































large public debt market rested on its promise to repay. The switch from absolutist to 
parliamentary rule made such a promise credible. Whereas it was difficult for a monarch 
holding the crown by divine right to commit not to repudiate past engagements, 
parliamentary rule, by securing individual rights and including wealth holders in the 
policymaking process, offered the required guarantee and reduced investment risk. France 
and Spain, who remained absolutist for another century, were unable to match British 
financial resources.24
Weingast (1995) further specified the notion of limited government as “market­
preserving federalism:” a particular type of federalism encountered in 18th-century England 
and 19lh-century United States, in which local governments enjoyed primary regulatory 
responsibility but could not use it to restrict the circulation of goods and factors of 
production in the economy. Echoing Root’s (1994, p. 156) study of the development of 
competitive markets in England and France, Weingast stresses the role of the common law 
system; unlike French courts, British courts were independent from the Crown and, 
moreover, they were local and in competition with each other. This made it difficult for 
possessors of royal monopolies to appeal to judges to defend their rents beyond London. 
The jurisdictional competition between urban and rural courts was instrumental in 
blocking the expansion of urban guilds to guild-free rural areas. By contrast, in France, the 
monarchy managed to bypass traditional local jurisdictions, establish the supremacy of 
royal statutes, and enforce royal monopolies-—on which royal finances depended—




























































































throughout the realm.25 The higher degree of centralization in France relative to England 
explains the lesser development of competitive markets in France.26
When is federalism market-preserving, when is it destructive? The answer is not a 
simple one, as too many checks and balances can be as bad as not enough. This is what 
comes out of Sylla’s (1997, 1999) account of the financial peregrinations of the American 
Revolution. The source of the inefficiency resided not in absolutism, as in pre- 
Revolutionary England, but in excessive decentralization—each colony floated its own 
debt, fueling inflation and currency depreciation. The new constitution of 1787 solved the 
problem by giving the federal government the power of taxation. The U.S. debt became 
popular with foreign investors, and, upon retirement, was replaced by the equity of 
incorporated business enterprises. Checks and balances may not always favor the 
development of financial markets; checks and balances devolve veto power to small 
coalitions, including those opposing financial development.
Legal Origins
Like the commitment approach, the legal origins approach attributes financial 
underdevelopment to deficient property rights. Common law secures market players’ 
property rights better than civil law. The causal path between law and market is not 
unique, but may take two different routes: a direct one (La Porta et al. 1997a, 1998) and 
an indirect one, mediated by the state (Rajan and Zingales 1999).
25 Weingast 1995, p. 7; Root 1994, pp. 150,157.
26 Focusing on the 17* and 18* centuries, Weingast and Root, o f course, have little to say about the actual development 
o f  corporate securities markets, which occurred in the 19th century. For an attempt to apply the argument to 19*- 




























































































La Porta et al. show that countries with poorer investor protections against 
expropriation by insiders, as reflected by legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, 
have smaller and narrower capital markets.27 These rules and the quality of their 
enforcement, they further show, vary systematically by legal origins—common law and 
civil law. In the common law system, the judge de facto makes the law, whereas in the 
civil law system, it is the legislator. Civil law systems are further divided into three 
families—French, German, and Scandinavian types. Common law countries, the authors 
argue, protect shareholders the most, French civil law countries the least, and German and 
Scandinavian civil law countries somewhere in the middle. Law enforcement is also lowest 
in French civil law countries.28
Like the social capital and institutional commitment literature, Rajan and Zingales 
(1999) start from the premises that markets and centralized power are incompatible. 
Governments are not ordinarily interested in ensuring investors’ property rights against 
expropriation or, even if law-bound, they prefer to deal with banks than with markets. 
Governments are also responsive to anti-market coalitions—the landed gentry in the 19lh 
century, the unemployed masses following the market crash of the 1930s—which markets 
seem to regularly generate by destroying primitive forms of insurance and providing little 
substitute. Therefore, decentralization of political power, by which they mean the
27 La Porta et al. 1997a. In an earlier formulation o f the hypothesis, De Cecco (1983, p. 14) also linked financial 
innovation to common law: “All this was possible because o f the Common Law approach, according to which all that is 
not expressly forbidden, is permissible, while the Roman Law tradition is, as it is known, rather the opposite, that is to 
say, that what is permissible is expressly identified by the written law.” For a criticism, see Caranza and Cottarelli (1987, 
pp. 187-188).




























































































precedent-based, judge-administered system of common law encountered in England and 
ex-colonies, safeguards property rights and promotes financial innovation.29 Common law 
owes this advantage to its peculiar dynamic, blocking top-down changes ordered by the 
political center, but open to grass-roots contractual innovation suggested by individual 
practitioners. For instance, the common law due process is better at legalizing complex 
ownership structures, as well as notions of trust and good faith, which are typical of the 
arm’s length contracts between firms and investors in financial markets (p. 29). Civil law 
in contrast cannot evolve on its own but requires an act of the legislator, making it “an 
easy prey to political movements advocating a command and control system” (p. 11). In 
sum, Rajan and Zingales offer a plausible argument for the legal origins of stock market 
performance. Common law is a bulwark against state control and state control is bad for 
markets.
The legal origin argument has the merit to provide a rationale for a well-known, yet 
poorly understood, stylized fact—the greater market-orientation of Anglo-Saxon 
countries. The legal origin argument yields a tangible and testable set of hypotheses, and is 
more scientific than the standard reference to the Anglo-Saxon cultural and historical 
predilection for markets. Furthermore, the direction of the causal relationship, if any, is 
beyond doubt—legal systems were adopted either long ago or in response to conquest or 
colonization.30 They are not endogenous to financial development.
29 In the common law system, the judge de facto makes the law, whereas in the civil law system, it is the legislator.





























































































Market segmentation points to the externalities that various types of financial 
intermediaries create for each another. It is not a recognized approach, unlike previous 
ones, but a collection of disparate studies, which I consider together because of a few 
commonalities. These studies do not solely focus on the large commercial banks or the 
security markets, but also look at the non-noble segments of banking—savings banks, 
credit cooperatives, mortgage banks, local banks, and local security markets—of which 
the weight in the banking system can be large indeed, sometimes well above seventy 
percent. Within this broad set, some studies attribute cross-national variations in banking 
structures to incompatibilities between various banking sectors, and between the banking 
sector and the securities market.
Gueslin and Lescure (1995), have emphasized the rivalry between state and savings 
banks. They asked why nonprofit banking, especially in the form of credit cooperatives, 
did not take root in France the way it did in Germany. They answered the question by 
pointing to the unfair competition of postal savings. Credit cooperatives could not afford 
the subsidized rates paid by the state savings bank on small individual deposits.31 Deeg 
(1992) chronicled the secular rivalry between the large Berlin banks and the savings and 
cooperative banks in Germany, showing how the existence of a very strong non-profit 
sector at the outset constrained the development of the Berlin banks.32
31 Similarly, Vittas (1997, p. 172) and Guinnane (1994, p. 51) argue that the creation o f postal savings in the UK and 
Ireland narrowed the scope o f  urban and rural credit co-operatives.
32 Ziegler (1991, p. 11) links, in the German case, the competition o f  the savings banks and cooperatives to the 




























































































Vittas (1997) argues that large securities markets in Anglo-Saxon countries, by 
enabling large borrowers to bypass banks, forced banks to concentrate on small firms and 
the retail market. In contrast, weak securities markets in continental Europe allowed banks 
to maintain close relations with large firms and neglect households and small and small 
firms. They left room for savings banks and credit co-operatives to grow (p. 171). The 
Netherlands, according to Jonker (1996b), was another case of overgrown securities 
market. However, the banks did not respond to the challenge by crowding out savings 
banks and credit cooperatives, as Vittas argues they did in Anglo-Saxon countries, but 
merely stagnated. Norway, according to many Norwegian historians, offers a case in 
which indigenous banks failed to develop because of the early entry of foreign banks in the 
primary product sectors.33 In Britain, in contrast, the presence of London at the heart of 
the world money market offered banks a unique line of business, which was not equally 
available to banks in other countries.
Another instance of the zero-sum logic is the thesis that universal banking stifles 
market mediation. In specialized banking systems, deposit banks specialize in short-term 
ventures, leaving the business of issuing securities to investment banks and brokerage 
houses. In universal banking systems, the same banks perform both the commercial and 
investment functions. Combining lending, underwriting, and brokerage has been generally 
associated with atrophied capital markets, suffering from low competition, private 
placement, self-regulation, insiders’ trading, and instability.34 In contrast, the institutional
33 See Knutsen 2000.
34 Riesser, the apologist o f German universal banking, bemoaned the extent o f  private placement, which he blamed for 




























































































separation between banks and markets has generally been favorable to competition, public 
regulation, the participation of a broad segment of the population, thick trading, and 
greater stability.35
All these explanations rest on a “crowding-out” logic, according to which a banking 
or financial sector came first and succeeded in saturating its market and pre-empting the 
development of others. These explanations differ, however, with respect to the identity of 
the sector that is expected to be making the first move—the state, as Gueslin and Lescure 
argue, the non-profit sector, as Deeg argues, or the financial market, as Vittas and Jonker 
argue.
What causes fragmentation to vary across nations and how? Two types of answer are 
discemable in the literature. One builds on an historical process known in economics as 
path dependency, which obtains when the costs of abandoning institutions that perform 
sub-optimally may be higher than the resulting inefficiencies. Path dependency surfaces in 
the works of Jonker and Vittas.36
An alternative to path dependency is interest group politics. Different producer 
groups have different institutional preferences, which they ask politicians to legislate in 
exchange for electoral resources. Although this type of study is still underdeveloped in the
Cologne stock market as an “inside” stock exchange (1966, p. 120). Sylla remarks that the German “banks developed 
something like an internal stock market’ (1997, p. 211). However, both Riesser and Tilly acknowledge that issuing security 
was the banks’ only way out o f long-term, sometimes doubtful, credits to a client company, Riesser 1911, p. 364 and 
Tilly 1966, p. 120.
35 This argument is made by Sylla and Smith 1995 and Sylla 1997.
36 Note that the path dependency model is often underspecified, reducing the present value o f a variable to its past value 
and a random term. More sophisticated modeling would balance the cost o f  change against the opportunity cost of 




























































































field of finance, the literature points to a definite correspondence between financial 
intermediaries and borrowers. Deeg shows that German banking sectors have clienteles 
that are specialized, both along geographical lines and on the basis of firm size—large 
firms do business with the commercial banks, whereas artisans, fanners, and small and 
medium-sized companies on average patronize the savings banks and credit cooperatives. 
The financial interests of the small borrowers are articulated by the non-profit 
organization, whereas those of the large borrowers are articulated by the for-profit 
banks.37 Echoing aspects of Deeg‘s findings on Germany are the works of Polsi (1993) 
and Conti and Ferri (1997) on Italy. They argue that the profit and non-profit banking 
sectors have differentiated clienteles; the former banks with large firms, the latter caters to 
the specific needs of local, small enterprises, shopkeepers, and artisans. Looking at 
Britain, Zeitlin (1995, p. 105) points to the disappearance of regional for-profit banking as 
a cause for the disappearance of small firms and industrial districts.
The correspondence between financial institutions and producer groups suggests that 
the latter have a stake in the organization of finance. It also alerts us to the fact that 
financial regulation may often be no more than another arena for the redistributional 
conflict between organized producer groups. It brings to mind the “rent-seeking” 
literature, according to which market failure is more often the fact of government “excess” 
regulation than of any breakdown in the market mechanism.38 A potential limit of the rent­
37 Riesser, the self-designated apologist for the German credit banks, recognized in 1905 that “German credit banks have 
hitherto done little for the craftsmen and the small manufacturers and tradesmen” (1977, p. 225).



























































































seeking approach to finance lies in the difficulty in accounting for the 
between interest groups.
Curb Market
A potential extension of the fragmentation literature is what I call the “curb market” 
hypothesis: Markets develop to overcome excessive regulation and market fragmentation. 
The hypothesis is particularly apt at explaining the emergence of international markets, 
such as the 17Ih century paper market. It has also been used to account for the emergence 
of internal commercial paper markets in Britain and the United States. The vigorous inland 
bill market in Britain, according to Neal (1994, p. 170), grew in the 18th century to make 
up for two regulatory failures, the disappearance of small coinage, caused by the 
undervaluation of silver by the Mint, and the Bank of England monopoly on the joint- 
stock (corporate) status, preventing country banks from opening branches countrywide 
and settling payments by means of checks. Absent coins and checks, traders resorted to 
commercial paper endorsed by a reputable banking house. In the case of the United States, 
legislation protecting unit (single-agency) banking led the largest firms after the Civil War 
to escape monopolistic lending rates by selling promissory notes on the open market. The 
market developed without bank endorsement, which banks were unwilling to grant in the 
absence of a central bank offering rediscounting facility.39
A recent illustration is provided by the development of the Eurobond market in the 
mid-1960s, as a way for large banks to circumvent reserve requirements and interest rate 

































































































been interpreted as an illustration of the principle that state regulation invites market 
circumvention.40 Harmed by tight monetary and reserve regulations, banks evaded the 
prescriptions of the central bank by creating non-bank subsidiaries and engaged in off- 
balance-sheet operations and the development of market-based credit instruments. All 
these explanation are, in essence, instances of the “curb market” theory of market origins, 
according to which markets develop informally to circumvent govemment- 
(over)regulation of market transactions.
The Convergence Thesis
This survey would not be complete without the mention of the convergence thesis. 
More a null hypothesis than a thesis, it states that whatever institutional variations may 
exist in financial systems are being erased by the global market-induced convergence on 
the Anglo-Saxon model.41 The mechanism for this homogenization is international market 
competition. Global convergence was the object of an intense controversy that was best 
summarized by Cohen (1996).
Conclusion
The first and last aside, the approaches that I have surveyed divide into market failure 
and regulatory failure. Capital scarcity and state capacity together, fixed costs, and 
information asymmetry, account for financial diversity in terms of second-best responses 
to market failure. In contrast, social capital, institutional commitment, legal origins,
40 For example, see Kane 1981, De Cecco 1987.
41 This argument is endorsed, in part at least, by Strange 1986, Goodman and Pauly 1993, Gill and Law 1993, Helleiner 




























































































fragmentation, and curb market attribute financial diversity to a regulatory failure. All 
these approaches are equally valid a priori and each one captures some aspect of the 
historical reality.
My work is consonant with the rent-seeking component of the fragmentation 
approach.42 Financial diversity reflects the regulatory competition among various types of 
lenders and borrowers. I mentioned earlier that the rent-seeking approach has difficulties 
predicting the outcome of the influence contest between contending coalitions. The study 
of political institutions helps solve this theoretical difficulty. Political institutions are not 
neutral, but bias the power game in favor of certain groups and at the expense of others.
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